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Abstract: 
This paper critically looks at the interfaces between the ideal notions of civil society and 
participation within the remit of Bangladesh’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
formulation process. On the one hand, the idea of civil society has likened as a renaissance 
and is often considered to be the most likely route out of development ‘problems’, 
particularly in the poor countries. Dominant development discourses have scripted the liberal 
interpretation of civil society as the only game in town. However, on the other hand, as a 
consequence of growing criticism on the failure of top-down development approach in the 
late 1960s, and throughout most of the 1970s, there was a sudden upsurge of interest that 
ordinary citizens might have a part to play in the development process.  A generalised 
consensus took shape that people’s participation in projects is an important component of 
development programmes and a means to their success and hence participation has turned out 
to be a ‘new paradigm’ of development. The PRSP framework, that precepts a romantic 
marriage between civil society and participation, was foisted by two major International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) as a condition of further debt and other development assistance 
for all poor countries. Participation from ‘all relevant stakeholders’ including civil society 
was trumpeted as a significant policy shift from previous development prescriptions of these 
IFIs. This article presents observation from 36 semi-structured interviews with civil society 
representatives including key people who prepared and finalised the PRSP of Bangladesh and 
the review of 6 daily national papers (September 2004 – October 2005). This piece argues 
that, in theory, participation can be manifested as the ‘key’ for development, but in practice, 
participation can be an iron hand in a velvet glove. Participation can turn into parroting and 
often resemble similar views those are ‘expected’ and required to validate external 
framework. Moreover, through such process of mainstreaming participation, an interest group 
within the civil society can emerge who has the technical knack of producing development 
policy according to donor recipe with some flavour of participation. This work therefore asks 
whether civil society and participation should be used as technologies of social control or as 
anti-hegemonic and anti-clientelistic forces in order to empowering marginalised members of 
the society.   
 
 
 
Key Words: civil society, participation, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 
development, Bangladesh 
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Introduction: 
Since the end of the Cold War, the idea of civil society has undergone something of a 
renaissance and is often considered to be the most likely route out of development 
‘problems’, particularly in the poor countries (Diamond; Linz and Lipset 1988, Harbeson; 
Rothchild and Chazan 1994, Landell-Mills 1992, Lewis 2002, Mercer 2003). There is even 
considerable evidence that civil society has become the de facto and de jure representatives 
of particular segments of the population in the design, implementation, and monitoring of 
public policy (Gurza Lavalle; Houtzager and Castello 2005). Civil society can also serve a 
crucial watchdog function by holding the government accountable to the people (Stiles 2002). 
Like civil society, participation has emerged as another catchphrase within the ambit of 
development policies. Richardson (1983) argues that prolonged failure of top-down 
development approach led to fundamental changes in public attitudes to authority, making 
people no longer willing to accept decisions made by others on their behalf. This led to 
believe that participation by the poor and marginalised people, for whom most development 
programmes are designed, would make development policies more realistic and also 
accelerate targeted outcome. This paper explores the contemporary nexuses between civil 
society and participation, especially in the context of poverty reduction prescriptions for the 
poor countries taking Bangladesh as a case study.  It starts with providing brief theoretical 
discussions on civil society and participation within the realm of development. These are 
followed by how the notions of civil society and participation have been meshed up into one 
of the latest development prescriptions, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 
suggested by the international financial institutes (IFIs) such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Civil society participation have been lauded as a positive 
policy shift (Booth 2003, Oxfam 2004) in IFIs’ development approach where past policies of 
these organisations have been criticised for being hierarchical and top-down those failed to 
deliver. This piece presents empirical evidence from Bangladesh and investigates the nature 
and process of civil society participation in the construction of Bangladesh’s PRSP. This 
leads to ask in the conclusion whether civil society participation should be used as a 
smokescreen or as anti-hegemonic and anti-clientelistic forces in order to empowering 
marginalised members of the society.    
 
Civil Society and the discourse of Development 
The term civil society has been associated with the formation of a particular type of political 
authority, for example, an authority that seeks greater good and/or pursues common goals. 
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But the ambiguity of the concept arises from its changing meaning over time. To illustrate, 
for seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers, civil society was defined in contrast to the 
state (Kaldor 2004, Chandhoke 1995). Civil society was a society characterised by the rule of 
law, based on certain fundamental individual rights, which were enforced by a political 
authority also subject to the rule of law
i
. However, there remain major differences in its 
classical origin and contemporary usage, especially in the context of 
(international)development. For the World Bank, civil societies are varied in their nature and 
composition
ii
. The Department for International Development (DFID), UK (2010) 
comprehends that the notion of civil society is rooted in Western European and North 
American political thought and experience
iii
.  The discourse of development in which civil 
society has come to signal the ensemble of associations which exist outside the state (mostly 
as an ‘opposition’) including the private sectoriv (Bratton 1988; 1994, Makumbe 1998, 
Rothchild and Chazan 1988). The most important issue in the growth of civil society is the 
formation of collective ‘consciousness’ that shapes perceptions and experiences of the 
society. For example, when large numbers of the population of a community, town, region, 
state, or even at a global level, begin to conceive of common needs, truly powerful changes 
can occur, as can be seen concerning civil rights, environmental, gender and regional 
separatist issues
v
 (Jenkins 2001).This premise is based on the liberal/pluralist conception of 
society’s relationship to the state, where civil society as an anti-hegemonic force serve to 
aggregate and articulate mass opinion and preferences of the marginalised members of the 
society. However, according to Lavalette and Ferguson (2007), the present vogue of civil 
society is a result of the way the concept has been used over recent years to protest against 
the impact of global neo-liberalism, third-world debt and imperialist war. Civil society 
organisations are often identified as key sources of mobilisation and resistance to the power 
of the global financial institutions and the central states of the most economically powerful 
nations. Dominant development discourses have scripted the liberal interpretation of civil 
society as the only game in town (Mercer 2003), and inherently good for development 
(Bickford 1995, Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, Orvis 2001).  
 
 ‘Civil society empowerment’ initiative is well underway among donor agencies in terms of 
‘delivering’ development and is seen as a key element in the promotion of human rights, 
democratisation, hastening economic development, reducing poverty and strengthening civil 
society as a goal in itself (Archer 1994, Howell 2002, Howell and Pearce 2002, Lewis 2002, 
Stiles 2002, 1998). In 1996, the idea that development should be undertaken through civil 
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society had become an industry orthodoxy. Major studies had been completed, or were in 
progress, by bodies such as the World Bank and the DFID (Whaites 2000). In supporting 
civil society, donor agencies pursue a combination of broad goals. However, the principal 
hazard of an emergent civil society lies in the active and well-meaning efforts of international 
agencies and bilateral and aid donors to fabricate a civil society. In South Asia but even more 
so in Africa and post-socialist Europe, a civil society is being manufactured by donor 
resources (Sobhan 2000). This has been the case for Bangladesh too where the notion of civil 
society was deeply embedded in its social structure before any donor intervention or 
‘invention’ both in traditional and organised formsvi. The idea of civil society is not entirely 
new in Bangladesh but recent talks and discourses can be seen as pushing the idea by 
international development agencies as part of their development and ‘good governance’ 
agenda (Lewis 2004, Stiles 2002). Recent times have witnessed a significant influence and 
patronage from donors as White (1999) suggests that ultimately the donors have ‘captured’ 
NGOs and civil society in Bangladesh.  Perhaps, this has happened in accord of Bangladesh’s 
dependence on foreign aid as a significant number of development programmes are funded 
by foreign aid including a number of government projects those are running totally on 
external economic sources.  
 
Civil society assistance is not limited to promoting democracy or good governance. It also 
accords with a broader agenda of promoting neo-liberal economic policies (Howell 2002, 
Howell and Pearce 2002, Howell and Lind 2009).However, the optimism that grew during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s concerning how civil society would offer a space through 
which collective interests could be represented, providing a voice and means of 
empowerment to previously excluded people, has become matched with scepticism over 
these claims (Hickey and Bracking 2005). Perhaps the most comprehensive example in this 
regard is the involvement of civil society organisations in the formulation of national poverty 
reduction strategy papers which is discussed in this paper with empirical evidence from 
Bangladesh case.  
 
A need for participation: counting reality from bottom or legitimating development 
from top?  
A need for engagement of local people in the development process is being felt, perhaps, 
because the top-down approach to development has often failed to deliver, and participation 
by local people is thought to be the key to sustainability by development thinkers
vii
. In the 
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early days of development, donor agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, were organised 
and shaped by the understanding that their mission was to deliver development to the poor 
countries. (Long 2001, emphasis added). Local people had hardly any significant role in this 
process apart from supplying cheap labour required for development projects. From the 
1970s to the 1990s, a generalised consensus took shape that people’s participation in projects 
is an important component of development programmes and a means to their success 
(Cornwall 2000, Laderchi 2001, Richardson 1983). Chambers (1997) argues that 
participation by community members was assumed to contribute to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of investment and to promote the processes of democratisation and 
empowerment. There were even claims that participation constituted a ‘new paradigm’ of 
development as participation meant empowerment and mutual respect and enabled poor 
people to express and analyse their individual perceptions and shared realities
viii
. 
 
According to the World Bank (2001), participation increases public accountability, reduces 
corruption and bureaucratic sclerosis, and provides better  inputs to public policy. The World 
Bank (1996) defines participation as a process through which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives, and the decisions and resources which affect 
them. What the World Bank sees as participation is not only participation by the poor and 
disadvantaged groups. Rather, the Bank seems seeking participation beyond this level, what it 
calls ‘stakeholder participation’.  Such illustration by the World Bank sounds ‘generous’, 
‘attractive’ but are oversimplified. This outlines one specific form of participation cooked up 
by the World Bank. Although this definition clubs together all stakeholders, general citizen 
are not being mentioned as one of the stakeholders. It ignores inequalities which affect the 
ability of different stakeholders, particularly those who are poor and marginalised (Tandon 
and Cordeiro 1998). This also conceals the hierarchical and hegemonic relationships among 
the stakeholders as it does not say whether participation will take place on equal terms for ‘all 
stakeholders’ point of views or whether this is a condition imposed by a stronger stakeholder 
in this process. Participation, therefore, seems to add-up new spice in the development recipe 
that ostensibly implies discarding mainstream development’s neo-colonial tendencies, 
Western-centric values and centralised decision-making processes. It appears to stand for a 
more inclusive and ‘bottom-up’ politics, which takes two dominant institutional forms. First, 
it seems to aim at promoting local community ‘empowerment’; and second, ensuring 
‘ownership’ of development programmes where the state and/or international development 
agencies seek civil society involvement for policy development and agenda setting
ix
 (Kapoor 
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2005). Participation therefore purports to represent vox-populi and emerges as new 
development orthodoxy.  
 
However, critics insist that consensus-based decisions, made in ‘participatory’ meetings and 
consultations, are single, as most often they are. They overlook or suppress community 
differences and tensions by frequently ignoring class, gender, inequality, power relations and 
other thorny issues (Mohan and Stokke 2000, Mosse 2001). Often decisions are made on the 
basis of inadequate participation; for example, beneficiaries are consulted after the 
programme design and goals have already been set
x
 (Kapoor 2005). The tendency of 
participatory processes to seek consensus may only conceal that such consensus is more 
apparent than real and actually represents the wishes of the most powerful players (Johnson 
and Mayoux 1998: 165 – 166). Therefore, participation may not only be seen as a new 
development orthodoxy but also as a ‘new tyranny’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001), a legitimising 
means where it is also critiqued for failing to deliver development.  
 
The PRSP framework and the marriage between civil society and participation 
The PRSP framework was introduced in 1996 by the World Bank and IMF for the poor 
countries in order to centralise their lending mechanism as well as to synchronise 
development assistance by other donors. The first core principle of the PRSP approach is that 
it should be country owned, based on broad-based participatory processes. Although the idea 
of participation by civil society was a relatively new element in the discourse of the IFIs that 
has been operationalised with the introduction of the PRSP process, it is observed that a clear 
definition was missing and what exactly was suggested and expected by ‘participation’ was 
not clarified
xi
 (Dijkstra 2005, World Bank and IMF 2005, Molenaers and Renard 2003, 
Meyer, Schmidt and Schmitt 2001). The World Bank stressed that participatory process itself 
would vary greatly from country to country because of each developing country’s unique set 
of political and social institutions, and an idiosyncratic history of civil society participation 
(World Bank 2002 a: 5). An Oxfam  report (2004) and Booth (2003) argue that perhaps the 
‘process conditionality’ of including participation in PRSPs was problematic and 
contradictory but had nevertheless opened new spaces for dialogue in many countries, and the 
political profile of poverty issues in-country had thereby been raised.  
 
Criticism was always at the centre of many debates that ‘participation’ in the PRSP context 
means just ‘consultation’ and ‘cooption’, not ‘joint responsibility’ or ‘joint decision-making’ 
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(Eberlei 2007, Oxfam 2004, Bradshaw and Linneker 2003).  Nevertheless, critics have 
identified a number of limitations of ‘participation’ in the PRSP process. To illustrate, for the 
governments, participation was clearly a conditionality imposed from creditors, to which they 
have had no alternative but proving that they are in compliance, regardless of their own 
agendas on the subject and depending on how weighty the resource packet involved. 
‘Participation’ and ‘consultation’ do not mean same things – what was named participation in 
the PRSPs in general could best be described as consultation (Dijkstra 2005, Oxfam 2004, 
Molenaers and Renard 2003, Knoke and Morazan 2002, Meyer, Schmidt and Schmitt 2001). 
Sometimes the governments opted for technical consultations with sample communities, 
which in some countries were validated in particular districts (municipalities). Practically 
most countries convened consensus building workshops in each region (province, 
department) and a final national one. Through ‘invited consultation’ participation at best 
could lend a ‘false legitimacy to autocratically made decisions’ (Alexander 2004: 12).  
 
PRSP design in most countries did not start from scratch. Some of the most important 
decisions have been ‘pre-empted’ by prior government-IFI agreements, for example, on 
PRGF conditionalities and HIPC triggers (Booth 2003) or other programmes which they had 
to fulfil to satisfy donors (Fraser 2005). A handful of donor-pleasing programmes and 
projects, were further combined with some civil society consultation. It was clear that the 
policy prescriptions within PRSPs did not come from participation processes, and instead 
continued to reflect the backstage influence of the donors’ own agendas as conditions were 
imposed by donors and/or were dominated by the interests of the non-poor elite
xii
 (Eberlei 
2007, Oxfam 2004). In some cases, a rather narrow view of ‘civil society’ was taken (Booth 
2003) and these processes were dominated by urban, professional groups, humanitarian 
NGOs and their umbrella bodies and were convened using highly technical language. This 
had effectively excluded significant membership organisations such as trade unions and 
producer associations, peasant groups, religious associations and professional associations 
(Fraser 2005, Oxfam 2004, Booth 2003). Only sporadic attempts had been made to engage 
the existing media, parliamentary committees, audit offices and watchdog bodies in 
monitoring and holding the government to account for delivering on PRS commitments, or to 
strengthen their capacity and commitment to fulfil this role (Driscoll with Evans 2003, 
Eberlei and Henn 2003). In most countries among the stakeholders, ‘the poor’ and especially 
poor women were heavily underrepresented and even neglected in most PRSP processes 
(Bliss 2006, Eberlei  and Siebold 2006, Oxfam 2004).  
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Bangladesh – a case Study 
This section presents evidence from 36 semi-structured interviews
xiii
 (although views from all 
interviews have not used in this article) convened in 2006 with civil society representatives in 
Bangladesh including key people who prepared its first final PRSP. This section also includes 
observation from the review of 6 national daily newspapers of Bangladesh for 13 months 
prior to the finalisation of Bangladesh’s PRSPxiv.  
 
The Government of Bangladesh decided to start the preparation of an Interim-PRSP (IPRSP) 
at the 2000 Bangladesh Development Forum meeting.  Since then the status of the PRSP has 
arguably been elevated to ‘the’ documentxv that will guide external financing of Bangladesh’s 
development and poverty reduction agenda (Hossain 2002). Preparation of the IPRSP was the 
responsibility of a taskforce constituted in December 2000 and headed by the Secretary of the 
Economic Relations Division of the ministry of Finance
xvi.   To show a ‘poverty reduction 
strategy document’ at the Paris Consortiumxvii, the IPRSP was prepared hastily before the 
donor meeting and the Finance Minister of Government of Bangladesh took the document 
with him in order to prevent any awful situation in front of the donors. The manner in which 
the participatory process was conducted has been described as an eyewash (Akash 2002). The 
I-PRSP process in Bangladesh was limited within inter-ministerial committees
xviii
 which did 
not include any representative from the civil society, the private sector and development 
NGOs (Deb, Raihan and Ahamed 2004).  
 
Followed by the IPRSP, the government in 2005 prepared its final version of the first PRSP. 
The General Economics Divisions (GED) of the Planning Commission of the Ministry of 
Finance undertook the lead to prepare a full PRSP from the IPRSP. As stated in the PRSP, 
the GED states that four effective participatory strategies were put in place. First, a high-
powered National Steering Committee headed by the Principal Secretary to the Prime 
Minister was established to steer the process of preparing a full-blown poverty reduction 
strategy. Second, a National Poverty Focal Point was established within the GED of the 
Planning Commission to act as the secretariat for the strategy formulation process. Third, 19 
theme areas were identified for which thematic groups were constituted under the relevant 
ministries for preparation of thematic reports that would feed the final strategy
xix
. Fourth, 
regional consultations were undertaken with representation from a wide cross section of 
society including elected functionaries and grass roots organizations. Over and above the 
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specific steps initiated by the Government, the availability of a National Poverty Focal Point 
also galvanized a secondary process of participation in which active segments of civil society 
undertook their own consultative exercises, and channelled their outputs to the formulation 
team. With the completion of the draft PRSP in December 2004, a concluding round of 
consultations were initiated prior to finalization. The most comprehensive of these was with 
Members of Parliament both through the medium of the parliamentary standing committees 
and through three special all-party meetings held at the behest of the Speaker of the 
Parliament under the aegis of the Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy Project. In 
addition, consultations were held with development partners, civil society/academics, NGOs, 
media representatives, eminent persons, women spokespersons, and adivashi/ethnic 
minorities’ representatives. The final PRS document incorporated relevant suggestions 
emerging from these consultations (GED 2005: xii, emphasis added). 
 
This is worth noting that the PRSP does not provide any indication what ‘relevant 
suggestions’ were incorporated and how they were prioritised. In following sections, 
government’s claim of including civil society participation in the PRSP is contrasted by using 
the views expressed by civil society representatives, in order to disinter the actual practice 
that took place in the production of Bangladesh’s PRSP. 
 
A company of parrots 
This section delineates a process how a panoptic and ostensible form of participation help 
creating a ‘participating circle’. This circle is being used to meet the requirement of 
‘participation’ from ‘all relevant stakholders’ in legitimating an external as well as 
hierarchical development approach. Farida Akhter (2006), a women activist, and B. K. 
Jahangir (2006), a political anthropologist, argued that there were ambiguities in the 
conceptual and structural arrangements of participatory consultation meetings for the PRSP 
of Bangladesh. They insisted, participants at the consultation meetings had two options. First, 
one could praise whatever had been prepared or proposed in the PRSP and then might feel 
honoured and privileged for being invited to the meeting. Or, one might realise that the 
framework had not enough space for views from outside. The organisers were in full control 
of the process; they could record, ignore or even delete any argument if they wished. Mahfuz 
Anam (2006), editor of a national daily newspaper, argued that in an overnight and all of a 
sudden participation cannot produce views and voices from the bottom
xx
. The reality in 
Bangladesh is both development and governance are deeply hierarchical and bureaucratic. 
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Participation from wider sections of the society can barely feel welcomed as a conducive 
mechanism is yet to be developed. 
 
Divisional level consultation meetings have been heralded as the key feature in claiming 
Bangladesh’s PRSP to be ‘participatory’. Concerns were expressed that participation could 
not be ensured through arranged (day-long divisional) meetings. M. M. Akash (2006), a 
professor of economics, insisted that poor people are intimidated, shy or embarrassed to talk 
before local elites and such fear increase when people from even further up the hierarchy are 
present. It was the task of the policy makers to understand the psychology of the poor who 
are shy and prone to be inexpressive rather than being articulate on poverty and poverty 
reduction in those consultation meetings (Haider 2005). Shihab Uddin Ahamad (2006) and 
Rezaul Karim Choudhury (2006), are NGO activists, explained that local level officers were 
asked to organise those meetings and were overwhelmed by the directions from the top. 
Neither were they interested in going beyond nor had they enough time to do so. They had to 
ensure that people who were attending to ‘secure’ participation would echo the voices from 
the top.  
 
“Quite often, officials at local levels have to organise meetings at very short notice 
because the time of the people at the top is more valuable than district level officials 
and local participants. So a participatory meeting could be arranged only when people 
at the top were able to manage their schedules to visit. District level officers had to be 
present at these meetings because their central bosses were visiting the territory and 
therefore, it was their utmost responsibility to satisfy their superiors. Given the 
underlying intention of gratifying their central bosses, they had very little time to 
ensure that poor people were present. Especially when nobody is going to investigate 
whether poorest of the poor are in the meeting. If the audience appears to have 
included a few participants from poor backgrounds that is alright for both the 
organisers and district level officers. An awkward situation in presence of central 
people is not desired so the district organisers have to be selective” (Choudhury 
Rezaul K. 2006). 
 
Yunus (2006), country’s sole noble laureate and a vanguard for micro-credit, observed that 
the participatory meetings for the preparation of the PRSP were pre-designed with a standard 
format.  
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“The reason is, if the standard procedure forces someone to go to village or remote 
area and to listen to the poorest, then to save his/her job s/he will maintain that and 
things will move forward in accordance to that format set by the elite at the centre. In 
the one hand, organisers go to villages or slums because they have to do so. On the 
other hand, participants in these meetings participate because they have been asked to 
join and may remain silent if they feel uncomfortable in an unfamiliar environment. 
The PRSP committee cannot claim the consultations took place in local people’s own 
set-ups. These were convened in an orthodox format. Participation in the PRSP was 
‘standard’ participation and there was plenty of speculation that it did not genuinely 
intend to include ordinary people in this exercise” (Yunus 2006). 
 
Critics also questioned a deadline for preparing and submitting the PRSP. They argued in a 
given time it was not possible to get to the unorganised and unsupervised people because it 
would have required more time and effort (Barkat 2006, Ahamad 2006, Ahmed M. 2006). 
Therefore, the people who developed the PRSP went to readily available organised groups, 
for example the beneficiary groups or clients of the NGOs. Anu Muhammad (2006), a 
professor of economics, insisted that participants were invited to these consultations who are 
somewhat informed on relevant issues by the NGOs they are attached to. They know what 
they need to say, they also know the language of these meetings; the vocabularies, the 
development jargon and buzzwords, and thus can fill the gaps with their skills left by the 
people at the top, especially when there is a need for participation. Catchphrases are 
introduced into this circuit and these groups learn these words quickly and use them 
regardless of whether they understand the phrases or not. What they understand is that if they 
can use those terms they will be invited to more participatory meetings (Akash 2006, 
Muhammad 2006). 
 
However, it is also observed that only people who were already known to the organisers were 
invited to district level and national consultations. Q. K. Ahmad (2006), an economist and 
developmentalist, and Farzana Islam (2006), a professor of anthropology, observed that it 
seems like the organisers wanted to listen to something that they already knew. The entire 
group of the selected people was part of a participating circle in the development business. 
Atiur Rahman (2006), an economist and development activist, insisted that in those meetings 
PRSP committee (or people they asked to organise meetings at district levels) invited people 
from selected NGOs whose work they were familiar with and some so-called civil society 
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representatives who they knew very well. It was not interactive; rather its purpose was to 
serve ‘mutual interests’. Rasheda K Choudhury (2006), an education activist, explained that 
traditionally in Bangladesh the people who are in charge, invite only those people who they 
know will support their approach and avoid those who are known to have alternative views 
(Choudhury Rasheda K. 2006). According to Nazrul Islam (2006), possibly there were big 
arrangements, media coverage, to witness participation by like-minded groups. In Bangladesh 
this is more akin to ‘a company of parrots’ that fulfils everyone’s purpose to maintain the 
‘formalities’ of participation.  
 
“…in the national level meetings a few common names and faces were present who 
generally go to most consultations, for example the same names can be found for 
good governance, gender, health, education and similar issues. The PRSP was 
extremely restricted. I was invited to couple of such meetings possibly because the 
organisers knew me” (Arefeen 2006). 
 
5.4 Emergence or creation of a ‘comprador class’* 
It has been gleaned that the trickle-down approach has been the dominant paradigm in the 
construction of Bangladesh’s PRSP. This has helped in ensuring an undue share of 
development fund for the elites, political leaders, bureaucrats and others involved in the 
process. These groups have taken their share which means that only minimal development 
assistance has gone to the bottom and actual poor (Majumder 2005). Anam (2006), Ahmad 
(2006) and H. K. Arefeen (2006) noted that the political leaders and the elites generally have 
not possessed the capacity to build-up development plans but have wanted their share from 
these plans. They lack required technical skills and knowledge. As a consequence, they have 
to depend on bureaucrats’ and consultants’ technical knack. The whole process can be 
perceived as what Mitchell (2002) described as the ‘rule of experts’. Experts enjoy a privilege 
position in brokering development; they assume a growing importance and capture 
                                                 
*
 This is not to mean to indicate classical Marxist concept of class. Instead it was adopted from a view expressed 
by one of the informants who referred to a particular interest group by using the phrase ‘comprador class’. The 
word comprador comes from the Portuguese for buyer (Heartfield 2005, Gantman and Parker 2006). But in 
English it has acquired a rather more critical sense in terms of the social relations of imperialism. Following this 
latter usage, Gantman and Parker used the word to denote a native of a colonised country who acts as the agent 
of the coloniser (Gantman and Parker 2006: 26). Vitalis (1990) argues that as ‘agents of foreign imperialism’, 
they act ‘against the interest of the national economy’. He illustrates that the category of comprador can 
encompass a wide variety of economic interests and activities, from importers to contractors to commission 
agents to bureaucrats with control over licenses to investors in industrial joint ventures. The common 
denominator is a foreign connection of some kind and the negative impact presumed to have on the political 
economy. 
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significant resources in the mediated cultures of development (Mosse and Lewis 2006). 
Critics pointed out that these consultants are one of the major obstacles to national 
development and poverty reduction. They however emphasised that this is not to mean that 
all the bureaucrats and consultants are alike but most of them, intentionally or indirectly have 
been absorbed into this process. Ahmad (2006) observed that dependence on the bureaucrats 
and consultants has not prevented the elites and political leaders dictating how development 
programmes will be prepared. The bureaucrat and consultant groups are given two choices. 
Either they can prepare policies as asked by donors and the government and can benefit from 
the process (in an apparent win-win situation). Or, they can refrain from doing so which is 
very difficult, especially for the bureaucrats, in a politically hierarchical society like 
Bangladesh. In the latter case, government and donors would find replacements who would 
follow instructions and take things forward in their way.   
 
Arefeen (2006), a professor of anthropology, argued that it is not only the hegemonic 
mechanism that has forced bureaucrats and consultants to become assimilated into this 
process. There are many who are very happy to be inside this arrangement and make their 
fortune from it. Very few can desist from the temptation to become assimilated within the 
hegemonic structure, and those few are not united. Apart from this small group, the 
bureaucrats and consultants have largely seemed uninterested in any action which does not 
serve their personal gains (Ahmad 2006). Psychologically they are not attached to the 
nation’s interest; rather they believe in the propaganda of those they have to trust in order to 
remain in the business (to serve their patrons who ensure their ‘brighter’ prospects). Their 
children go to English medium schools which are separate from mainstream education, they 
like to purchase property overseas and therefore what happens to Bangladesh as a whole is 
not their true concern. As a consequence, the policies they produce are made to follow orders 
and to ensure that political leaders, their patrons and this group have been looked after in a 
balanced way (Choudhury Rasheda K. 2006, Arefeen 2006). Nonetheless, some form of 
participation must be included to justify their stance and critics have compared participation 
in the PRSP of Bangladesh as whitewash.  
 
Selim Al-Deen (2006), a play-writer and professor of Dramatics, and Arefeen (2006) 
suggested that the development programmes these people devise are based on external 
prescription and hence are distant from local (and cultural) knowledge. Nazrul Islam (2006) 
and Farida Akhter (2006) observed that this is very visible in the way they do things. For 
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example, the language they employ is foreign. Not only is this inaccessible to the most of the 
people in the country but also often seems over intricate for the many donors whose first 
language is not English. This clearly indicates that the purpose is to satisfy their most 
powerful patrons
xxi
. Seraj (2006), a media personality and agricultural activist, noted that not 
only in terms of language, but also this group had also adopted vocabularies which are distant 
from the common people. They make their arguments in terms of economics, statistics and 
growth that are only understandable by less than one percent of the total population. Poverty 
reduction in a country context should not only include the participation from the economists, 
funding agencies, bureaucrats, consultants and political leaders; but also should incorporate 
larger sections of the society for whom the programmes are designed. But critics argued that 
a process geared to satisfying government and donors, and bestowing rewards on bureaucrats 
and consultants, shows how little these people are interested in actual poverty reduction in a 
given society (Haque 2006, Akhter 2006, Islam N. 2006).  
 
“The ruling class of Bangladesh welcomes and expects frameworks like this where 
there is space for mutual benefit and interest. The political leaders, the bureaucrats, 
the elites and neo-elites need such programme to establish a firmer grip on national 
development and also to secure their material and political interests. Whenever a 
proposition is made or a step taken to privatise state owned sectors, the elites and neo-
elites are elated because ultimately they enjoy the benefit with or without the 
association of international collaborators. Therefore, somehow they persuade the 
process to move on. I call them as a comprador class who always accept external 
approaches and enjoy benefits from these. Along with elites and political leaders, 
bureaucrats also represent this group and benefit from it” (Ahmed M. 2006, emphases 
added).  
 
Frameworks like the PRSP open up more such opportunities and the government cannot work 
as an autonomous body beyond these interest groups. The ruling class and the elites can see 
their ‘stake’ in such frameworks and therefore accept the policies without resistance. They 
did not take any critical stance against the PRSP framework as a package, and did not add or 
exclude any components of it either. There are many other policies in Bangladesh, such as, in 
health; education; and natural resources, did not require participation. But in the case of 
PRSP, there was a necessity for participation, and they incorporated some ‘bogus’ 
participation (Muhammad 2006). However, it was not explained why the PRSP framework 
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was accepted or why participation was sought, or what was better in this framework than 
previous Five Year Plans and why the shift was inevitable (Islam F. 2006, Muhammad 2006, 
Ahmed M. 2006). A docile group from civil society, developmentalists and researchers is 
being formed in various sectors of the society. This group had done exactly as they were 
directed (Muhammad 2006, Ahmed M. 2006, Ahamad 2006). In a Bangladesh context this 
was an interesting development. This can be likened to what Alavi (1972) explained for 
docile attitude of civil society. He asserted that in such process civil society cannot 
autonomously represent the mass population. Instead they act as a consenting group for state 
or international agencies. Inside the government there are bureaucrats and outside the 
government there are NGOs and consultant groups in this category. These groups are the 
Bangladesh part of an international development industry and act as a local franchise of their 
international counterpart (Muhammad 2006). They have no dissimilarity in their thinking or 
approach to their global patrons. Any announcement from the World Bank and IMF is 
reverberated and supported by these groups. Mozaffar Ahmed (2006) and Muhammad (2006) 
explained that the emergence of these groups can be understood from two positions. Firstly, 
they agree to act like the donor agencies because of the temptation of quick money and 
thereby become part of the hegemonic, hierarchical and politicised administration. Secondly, 
such a group has been created carefully with high salaries and other material benefits to work 
as ‘middlemen’ between the country and the international agencies. This group may be 
perceived as comprador intellectuals (Constantino 2000). They oppose any critical 
intellectual production at home or in the diaspora, and are linked like the class with which 
they are allied to imperial interests and policies of which they are the main local 
beneficiaries. Edward Said understands that they are the kind of intellectuals who choose to 
‘passively allow ... a patron or an authority to direct [them]’ rather than ‘represent ... the truth 
to the best of [their] ability’ (Said 1996: 121). Constantino argues that they provide defences 
for the indefensible, for example, huge foreign debt, privatisation, deregulation, import 
liberalisation and so on. They seek to discredit all alternatives to the neocolonial model of 
development. Comprador intellectuals are like cosmetologists who prettify the grim face of 
neocolonial reality (Constantino 2000: 425). An important feature of such process is that the 
common interests of local elites and external organizations whether they be foreign 
governments, multinational corporations or international agencies. External interests are 
maintained and represented by this ‘collaborative class’ within the economic and 
developmental arrangements in which foreigners hold the major stake (Smith 2009). The 
‘mutuality of interest’ across national boundaries between national economic elites and senior 
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management of trans-national corporations and banks produce a ‘transnational class 
formation’ of an international oligarchy with local and international ‘wings’ which ensured 
that public policy supported the interests of international capital (Becker and Sklar 1987). 
This envisages the order where external interests as thus included in the policy process, 
indigenous interests not represented by the elite are excluded. The government needs such 
groups to secure more aid and better relationships with international organisations that 
eventually play a crucial role for their political prospects. On the other hand, donors also need 
these groups for their agendas to be appropriately reflected in ‘locally owned’ policies. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A few important points need to be clarified that serve as the basis for the continuing 
discussion and drawing a conclusion for this piece. First, as conventionally defined, civil 
society is clearly a western (or northern) construct. The thinkers have developed the concept 
based on their situated values and experiences. Second, despite the notion’s origins in 
Europe, some scholars have effectively extended the idea of civil society beyond 
western/European experiences. This makes clear that there is more than one way to think 
about and apply the concept.  Finally, the notion that different sets of values and experiences 
can give rise to different conceptions or applications of ‘civil society’ leads us to the insight 
that it should not be seen as a static phenomenon. Moreover, its marriage with participation 
into development programmes is subjected to a plethora of organisational demands. For 
example, bureaucratic review and approval procedures, budgetary deadlines, and/or reporting 
requirements such as the collection of statistics (e.g. participation rates, frequency of 
meetings, gender breakdown of participants). This impedes participation being far from 
inclusive and bottom-up (Kapoor 2005). The discussion of civil society participation is 
therefore needs to be understood through the differences between rhetoric and reality. On the 
one hand, it is replete with grand-sounding promises of empowerment of the marginalised, 
and on the other hand, in practice this often takes the form of enlisting people in pre-
determined ventures and securing their compliance with pre-shaped development agendas 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001, White 1996). A combination of civil society and participation 
provides an attractive package that crank-up the legitimising endeavour for foisted 
development frameworks, especially when ‘participatory development’ is also subjected to 
criticism for not being able to deliver. 
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Furthermore, translating voices (generated from ‘participatory’ approach) into influence 
requires more than ways of capturing what people want to say; it involves efforts ‘from 
above’ and ‘from below’ (Gaventa and Robinson 1998). From within the authorities, 
responsiveness is contingent on wider institutional changes and the political will to convert 
professed commitment to participation into tangible action. Institutionalising participation in 
policymaking would require that political processes themselves become more open and 
participative – a process that is beyond the remit of the PRSP exercise (Piron and Evans 
2004). Changes in policy do not necessarily lead to changes in outcome. Policies can exist as 
intentions, or as symbols, but may never be put into practice. Lots of good policy exists 
which is not implemented properly, reflecting a gap between policy making and policy 
implementation. This requires strong political vision and concerted efforts from political 
leaders, bureaucrats, policy-makers and civil society (Li 2007). This paper therefore argues 
that participation needs to be recognised as a political issue; quite opposite to the romantic 
notions of ‘inclusion’ and normalisation process of external development agendas. There are 
always questions to be asked about who is involved, how, and on whose terms. Enhancing 
participation to empower the poor requires more than ‘inviting’ people to participate through 
incentives or by offering them ‘spaces to talk’. It requires active engagement in nurturing 
voice; building critical consciousness; widening spaces for involvement in decision-making; 
and building the political capabilities for democratic engagement within various prongs of 
social structure. Unless this is recognised and fed into policy making process, a push for 
‘participation’ from the top may remain as rhetoric and be used to authenticate an external 
agenda (Kamruzzaman 2009). A quest for universal mechanism for mainstreaming IFI loans 
and donor assistance through a monitorable, manageable and manufactured civil society has 
severely undermined the pluralistic and polyphonic character of civil society and its 
development. Presumptions adopted in the PRSP framework are based in large part on 
commonly shared western values and historical experiences, and, appear to leave little room 
for extending the idea of civil society in assorted developing country contexts – where 
difference, rather than commonality, is the rule. Through a preferred type of participation, 
local interest groups may be created and/or emerged as by-products in such process. Some of 
these groups will be ‘parroting’ in the guise of participation and that will deemed to be 
enough to rubber-stamping a hegemonic relationship. Whereas some groups will act as 
‘compradors’ under the façade of civil society, as demonstrated from Bangladesh’s PRSP 
experience. The notions of inclusion and empowerment through participation then at best 
appear to be mere lipservice, and, at worst a disingenuous stage-show to maintain neo-liberal 
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development agenda. Civil society, therefore, as a vehicle for seeking commonweal and 
pursuing collective interests turns out to be a very weak strategy and politically motivated. A 
strategy that is congruent to the ‘politics of the governed’ (Chatterjee 2004), where 
politicisation of civil society (as a technology of social control) has marginalised the poor 
people instead of putting forward their needs and demands. Overall, positive changes in the 
development mindset through civil society participation, at least in the PRSPs, remain a 
distant reality. ‘Participation’ by ‘civil society’ (broadly speaking) and thereby ensuring 
‘ownership’ of the PRSPs were the carrot that actually offered the IFIs (and other donors) 
some leeway to recuperate their policy exporting strategies against the failure (and criticism) 
of structural adjustment programmes.  
 
Nevertheless, it is also true that channelling donor supports as well as monitoring and 
evaluating progress are practical concerns for development assistance. Perhaps this has led 
the donor community to come up with a mechanism where both ‘progress’ and aid 
effectiveness can ‘effectively’ be measured that can be replicated to almost every aid-
receiving communities preferably by only changing its cover-page and prefaces. As stated 
above, such a quest for one size fit all approach fundamentally contradicts with pluralistic 
features of both civil society and participation (two major components those deemed to be 
positive steps forward for donor policies and have received widespread acclamation from the 
academics and researchers alike). This universalistic approach also undermines cultural; 
social; regional; behavioural and historical diversities of poor countries where civil society 
may exist in very different (and non-institutionalised) forms than the West and whose 
perception towards development and poverty reduction may be quite differing from growth 
based economic principles. Therefore, this is my contention to propose that instead of 
masquerading civil society and participation for glossing over external prescriptions, IFIs and 
donor communities should rethink how diverse forms of civil societies can be supported in 
different country contexts to build and sustain an inclusive and truly participatory 
mechanism, vis-a-vis to a unilineal framework such as PRSP, in order to promote local 
endeavours towards poverty reduction. I am aware that this proposition might be refuted as a 
chaotic one. But, it is more likely that, in contrast to token participations from consenting 
groups (and some clients/beneficiaries of various development projects) whose rent-seeking 
psychology help endorsing often incompatible external development prescriptions, these 
country specific policies will match up the theoretical promises of civil society and 
participation and advance the hopes and enthusiasm raised from these.     
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i
 Kaldor (2004) observes that the term was linked to the concept of ‘civility’. It meant respect for individual 
autonomy, based on security and trust among people who had perhaps never met. She explains, it required 
regularity of behaviour, rules of conduct, respect for law, and control of violence. Hence, a civil society was 
synonymous with polite society, a society in which strangers act in a civilised way toward each other, treating 
each other with mutual respect, tolerance and confidence, a society in which rational debate and discussion 
become possible. Whereas, Kumar explains, up to the end of the eighteenth century, the term ‘civil society’ was 
synonymous with the state or ‘political society’. Here it reflects precisely its classical origins. He further 
illustrates that ‘civil society’ was a more or less direct translation of Cicero’s societas civils and Aristotle’s 
Koinonia politike. Locke could speak of ‘civil government’ along with, and as an alternative term for, ‘civil or 
political society’. Kant sees burgerliche Gesellschaft as that constitutional state towards which political 
evolution tends. For Rousseau the etat civil is the state. In all these usages the contrast is with the ‘uncivilised’ 
condition of humanity – whether in a hypothesised state of nature or more particularly under an ‘unnatural’ 
system of government that rules by despotic decree rather than by laws (Kumar 1993: 376). Civil society in this 
conception expresses the growth of civilisation to the point where society is ‘civilised’. 
ii
 The World Bank uses the term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit 
organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, 
based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) therefore are a wide array of organisations: community groups, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, 
professional associations, and foundations (The World Bank 2010). 
iii
 Civil society embraces: institutionalised groups (such as religious organisations, trades unions, business 
associations and co-operatives), local organisations (such as community associations, farmers’ associations, 
local sports groups, non-governmental organisations and credit societies) and social movements and networks 
(DFID 2010). 
iv
 Habermas (1996: 365) understands civil society as ‘associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned 
to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form 
to the public sphere (and (...)) institutionalises problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside 
the framework of organised public spheres’. 
v
 Robert Cox (1999) sees civil society itself as a field of global power relations – involved in the reproduction of 
global capitalist hegemony but also containing the potential to organise counter-hegemony at this level. Thus, he 
insists that in the first instance, states (as agencies of the global economy) and corporate interests seek to use 
civil society in order to stabilise the social and political status quo that is globalised capitalism, for example 
through state subsidies to NGOs which orientate the NGOs towards operations in conformity with 
neoliberalism. Yet in the second dimension, and Cox uses the phrase ‘bottom up’ to describe this, civil society is 
the realm in which those who are disadvantaged by globalisation can mount protests and seek alternatives. In 
addition, Howell and Pearce (2002) argue that implications for global civil society and its developmental 
processes can be understood through two main points. First, people are ‘agents’ and second, people are ‘social 
beings’. When it is said, people are agents, this acknowledges that they have ‘agency’ – the means or ability to 
make (political) change happen, or to have some effect on things around them. This process legitimises an 
intellectual space, one in which it is recognised that all individuals through their diverse associations and 
organisations have the right to contribute to discussions about how to organise their society, deal with problems 
and ultimately define what kind of development is required and desired. For Ottaway and Carothers (2000), civil 
society is virtuously dedicated to giving citizens a voice, while political society is power-hungry, self-interested, 
and considerably less virtuous. 
vi
 ‘Traditional’ civil society organisations in Bangladesh can be found comprising of students, lawyers, 
journalists, religious charities, cultural activists and so on (Hashemi 1995, Hasan, 1999, Zaidi 1970) which is 
outstandingly visible in times of natural disasters and various relief works . In addition, formal civil society has 
been playing strategic role in strengthening the process of democratisation since the language movement 
(Rahman 1999), in fact, the movement against the military dictatorships of Ayub Khan and H M Ershad, and 
even the war of independence, were often led by civil society organisations rather than political parties (Hasan 
1999). 
vii
 Kapoor (2005) observes that two decades ago participation was anathema to transnational organisations such 
as the World Bank and IMF. Now, in the aftermath of sharp criticism about the top-down and exclusionary 
character of their structural adjustment programmes, not only do they embrace participation with confidence but 
also they make it a condition of assistance. Such as, for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) especially, 
debt relief is contingent upon a poverty reduction strategy (PRS), which in turn requires local ‘ownership’ 
(World Bank 2003). Recipient governments are expected to form ‘partnerships’ with civil society organisations 
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during the preparation of their PRSPs. Whereas McGee with Levene and Hughes (2002), describes the 
participation agenda as a social technology of control for the Northern actors – to impose particular conditions 
and particular values as well as to neutralise resistance. 
viii
 This shows that a need for fast-growing engagement of local people in the development process was being 
felt, perhaps, because the top-down approach to development had often failed to deliver, and participation by 
local people was thought to be the key to sustainability by development thinkers. Chambers (1997) questions the 
top-down approach of development and insists that the puzzle is how and why errors were so deeply entrenched 
in the beliefs, thinking, values and actions of development professionals. These included managers, scientists, 
planners, academics and consultants, of many disciplines, working in many organisations, such as aid agencies, 
national bureaucracies, research and training institutes, universities and colleges, and private firms. How could 
they all have been so wrong and wrong for so long? He asks how these errors were possible and why they were 
sustained for a prolonged period of time. 
ix
 The process of participation in development appears to be pulled in two directions at once: being promoted as 
benevolent, while professing neutrality in order to ‘empower the Other’ (Kapoor 2004). In first instance, there is 
an unmistakable self-righteousness that is being embraced in such an approach to participation. Here the 
mentality of the ‘burden of the fittest’ prevails: not only is pride taken in the philanthropic idea of ‘us’ helping 
‘them’, but also in the assumption that we (elites and professionals) know better than them (impoverished Third 
World communities). The ‘empowerment’ agenda in such an approach gives it an almost sublime character, for 
example, it is naturally progressive and tends to flow as blameless and honourable (Kapoor 2005). 
x
 Kapoor (2005) explains, in the meeting space itself, there may be several micro-power processes at play. For 
instance, rhetorical devices – polemical or sensationalist arguments, technical or esoteric language, 
misrepresentation or over-representation of evidence, loud or aggressive speech – can unduly influence opinion 
or silence and intimidate participants. While sometimes overt, these devices can be subtle, too, as when the 
meeting convenor invites technical or scientific ‘experts’ to speak to (to persuade) community members. 
Therefore the very condition of having to seek a consensus may also be a problem. 
xi
 As stated in the World Bank’s participation Sourcebook, the mechanisms of participation can be participatory 
research (i.e. perceptions of the poor), information dissemination, consultation (informal and structured)  and the 
formation of committees and working groups on issues dealt with in the PRSP (World Bank 2002 b: 238). 
xii
 An Oxfam (2004) report suggests that almost everyone involved in PRSP formulation is a middle-class 
technocrat. This was the case regardless of whether those people were women or men, or represented donors, 
government, international or local non-government organisations (NGOs) or other Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs). The result of this bias was often consensus – but it was rarely a consensus informed by the participation 
of poor women and men, and as such is unlikely to be pro-poor. 
xiii
 Interviews were carried out with the Chairman of the National Steering Committee for the PRSP, the 
secretary of the National Steering Committee for the PRSP, the lead consultant for the PRSP and other 
consultants, as well as members of the main drafting team for the PRSP (thematic team leaders from the 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, BIDS). In contrast to this group, interviews were also carried out 
with a number of academics, well known researchers and leading economists in the country, distinguished 
media and cultural personalities, top personnel in NGOs working on poverty issues, development activists, 
leading journalists, representative from ethnic groups, writers, leading thinkers and the sole noble laureate of 
Bangladesh. 
xiv
 Six Bangladeshi daily newspapers (three were in Bengali and three were in English) were selected for review 
over a period of thirteen months (October 2004 – October 2005). We chose the time of October 2004 to October 
2005 because this was just over a year before the final version of the PRSP of Bangladesh was prepared. The 
contents for this review were selected and comprised discussions on poverty, civil society, participation and the 
PRSP of Bangladesh. News items containing the titles with the words like poverty, poverty reduction, PRSP and 
development featured in selected newspapers during that time were coded in NVivo and used for qualitative 
content analysis. 
xv
 At the time of writing this paper a draft national five year plan is on the table ‘for consultation’ with civil 
society and the donors. The Government of Bangladesh has decided to go back to producing five year plans 
after developing two PRSPs.  
xvi
 Taskforce members included other Secretaries, Additional secretaries and Joint Secretaries from the 
Ministries of Finance, Women and Child Affairs, Social Welfare, Youth and Sports, Planning, Local 
Government and Rural Development, Statistical Division and the Prime Minister’s Office.  Two professional 
consultants were recruited to lead the drafting of the PRSP. The fact that the Government has sought to finance 
the PRSP process through external financing rather than investing its own resources is indicative of the political 
marginalisation of the PRSP (Hossain 2002). 
xvii
 Paris Consortium was the platform of donors who have operations and assistance programme in Bangladesh.  
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xviii
 According to Deb, Raihan and Ahamed (2004), an eleven-member Task Force, headed by the Secretary, 
Economic Relations Division (ERD), and drawing on representatives from the key ministries, was set up in late 
November 2000 to oversee the preparation of the Bangladesh I-PRSP. The Task Force included the Principal 
Secretary to the Prime Minister and 10 Secretaries from the Finance Division, Statistics Division, Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Rural Development and Cooperative Division, Local Government Division, Ministry of Youth 
and Sports, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Ministry of Women and Children 
Affairs, and Planning Division. 
xix
 According to the GED, ‘the thematic groups effectively functioned as a wide-ranging partnership between 
public sector ministries and research and professional institutions and agencies. The thematic exercise also 
played a significant role in motivating the Ministries and Divisions in an intensive process of reviewing and 
examining their own policy areas for all major cross-cutting, macroeconomic and real sector issues. The process 
of policy ownership of PRSs in the public sector thus acquired renewed vigour by ensuring full participation of 
the principal actors in the public sector and obtaining from them outcome-oriented thematic reports’ (GED 
2005: xii). 
xx
 Sanchez and Cash observed that the lack of appropriate institutional frameworks for participation has led both 
to widespread failure to facilitate broad based participation and poor quality participatory processes for those 
who can participate. This weakness in process has deeply affected both the quality of PRSP contents and 
national ownership (Sanchez and Cash undated). Participatory consultation, planning, and learning are vital but 
difficult in a country whose governance has so far often characterised as obedient and lacking in policy-oriented 
civil society organisations (Mutebi, Stone and Thin 2003). 
xxi
 Booth (2005: 5) argues that PRSPs have almost everywhere suffered severe slippages. The root cause was 
that those who exercised real power in countries were not interested in promoting required reforms. Most 
decisions were made informally, by small groups linked together by networks of clientelism and patronage. 
